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Privacy has become the object of considerable concern. The purely
fortuitous intrusions inherent in a compact and interrelated society
have multiplied. The more insidious intrusions of increasingly sophisti-
cated scientific devices into previously untouched areas, and the bur-
geoning claims of public and private agencies to personal information,
have created a new sense of urgency in defense of privacy. The intensity
of the debates about electronic eavesdropping and the privilege against
self-incrimination are but two examples of this urgency.
The purpose of this essay is not to add yet another concrete proposal,
nor even to call attention to yet another intrusion upon privacy. Rather
I propose to examine the foundations of the right of privacy-the rea-
sons why men feel that invasions of that right injure them in their very
humanity.
I.
To bring out the special quality of the concern over privacy I shall
first put a not entirely hypothetical proposal, which should serve to iso-
late from restrictions and intrusions in general whatever is peculiar
about invasions of privacy.
There are available today electronic devices to be worn on one's per-
son which emit signals permitting one's exact location to be deter-
mined by a monitor some distance away.' These devices are so small as
to be entirely unobtrusive: other persons cannot tell that a subject is
"wired," and even the subject himself-if he could forget the initial in-
stallation-need be no more aware of the device than of a small ban-
dage. Moreover, existing technology can produce devices capable of
monitoring not only a person's location, but other significant facts about
him: his temperature, pulse rate, blood pressure, the alcoholic content
of his blood, the sounds in his immediate environment-e.g., what he
* The author wishes to express his thanks to the Editors of the Yale Law Journal for
their very great understanding and skill in helping him to extricate the material for this
article from a much longer work now in progress, of which the discussion of privacy is a
small part.
j- Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. A.B. 1956 Princeton Universit); LLB. 1930
Columbia University; M.A. Oxon. 1961.
I. For a discussion of these devices and the legal issues to which they give rise, see Note,
Anthropotelemetry: Dr. Schwitzgebel's Machine 80 HARv. L. REV. 403 (1966).
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says and what is said to him-and perhaps in the not too distant future
even the pattern of his brain waves. The suggestion has been made, and
is being actively investigated, that such devices might be employed in
the surveillance of persons on probation or parole.
Probation leaves an offender at large in the community as an alterna-
tive to imprisonment, and parole is the release of an imprisoned person
prior to the time that all justification for supervising him and limiting
his liberty has expired. Typically, both probation and parole are
granted subject to various restrictions. Most usually the probationer or
parolee is not allowed to leave a prescribed area. Also common are re-
strictions on the kinds of places he may visit-bars, pool halls, brothels,
and the like-or the persons he may associate with, and on the activities
he may engage in. The most common restriction of the latter sort is a
prohibition on drinking, but sometimes probation and parole have been
revoked for "immorality"-that is, intercourse with a person other than
a spouse. There are also affirmative conditions, such as a requirement
that the subject work regularly in an approved employment, maintain
an approved residence or report regularly to correctional, social, or psy-
chiatric personnel. Failure to abide by such conditions is thought to en-
danger the rehabilitation of the subject and to identify him as a poor
risk.
Now the application of personal monitoring to probation and parole
is obvious. Violations of any one of the conditions and restrictions could
be uncovered immediately by devices using present technology or devel-
opments of it; by the same token, a wired subject assured of detection
would be much more likely to obey. Although monitoring is admitted
to be unusually intrusive, it is argued that this particular use of moni-
toring is entirely proper, since it justifies the release of persons who
would otherwise remain in prison, and since surely there is little that is
more intrusive and unprivate than a prison regime. Moreover, no one is
obliged to submit to monitoring: an offender may decline and wait in
prison until his sentence has expired or until he is judged a proper risk
for parole even without monitoring. Proponents of monitoring sug-
gest that seen in this way monitoring of offenders subject to supervision
is no more offensive than the monitoring on an entirely voluntary basis
of epileptics, diabetics, cardiac patients and the like.
II.
Much of the discussion about this and similar (though perhaps less fu-
turistic) measures has proceeded in a fragmentary way to catalogue the
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disadvantages they entail: the danger of the information falling into the
wrong hands, the opportunity presented for harassment, the inevitable
involvement of persons as to whom no basis for supervision exists, the
use of the material monitored by the government for unauthorized pur-
poses, the danger to political expression and association, and so on.2
Such arguments are often sufficiently compelling, but situations may be
envisaged where they are overridden. The monitoring case in some of
its aspects is such a situation. And yet one often wants to say the invasion
of privacy is wrong, intolerable, although each discrete objection can be
met. The reason for this, I submit, is that privacy is much more that just
a possible social technique for assuring this or that substantive interest.
Such analyses of the value of privacy often lead to the conclusion that
the various substantive interests may after all be protected as well by
some other means, or that if they cannot be protected quite as well, still
those other means will do, given the importance of our reasons for vio-
lating privacy. It is just because this instrumental analysis makes privacy
so vulnerable that we feel impelled to assign to privacy some intrinsic
significance. But to translate privacy to the level of an intrinsic value
might seem more a way of cutting off analysis than of carrying it for-
ward. In this essay I hope to show that it is possible to discuss what it
means to accord to privacy such a high status and to show why the value
of privacy should be recognized.
It is my thesis that privacy is not just one possible means among
others to insure some other value, but that it is necessarily related to
ends and relations of the most fundamental sort: respect, love, friend-
ship and trust. Privacy is not merely a good technique for furthering
these fundamental relations; rather without privacy they are simply in-
conceivable. They require a context of privacy or the possibility of pri-
vacy for their existence. To make clear the necessity of privacy as a con-
text for respect, love, friendship and trust is to bring out also why a
threat to privacy seems to threaten our very integrity as persons. To
respect, love, trust, feel affection for others and to regard ourselves as
2. The literature on privacy is enormous. A. WNEsTi, PRIVACy AND FUDONt (1967),
provides an exhaustive bibliography as well as a critical reiew of the literature. In addition,
Part One of that book presents a sensitive general theory of prilacy much along the lines
of the present article. Of particular interest also is the symposium on priracy in 31 L.¢w
& CoNrxIp. PROB. 251-435 (1966).
For an example of the fragmentary approach referred to in the text, as applied to one
manifestation of privacy, the privilege against self-incrimination, see McNaughton, The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional Affectation, Raison d'Etre and
Miscellaneous Implications, 51 J. CPa.%f. LC. & P.S. 138 (1960). Dean Prosser takes this
fragmentary approach to the right of privacy as recognized by tort law. Sec Prosser, Privacy,
48 CALrF. L. RFv. 383 (1960). And he has been criticized for it. Bloustein, Privacy as an
Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. R'. 962 (1964).
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the objects of love, trust and affection is at the heart of our notion of
ourselves as persons among persons, and privacy is the necessary atmo-
sphere for these attitudes and actions, as oxygen is for combustion,
III.
The conception of privacy as a necessary context for love, friendship
and trust depends on a complex account of these concepts, and they in
turn depend on the more general notions of morality, respect and per-
sonality. If my sketch of this underlying perspective leaves the reader
full of doubts and queries, I draw comfort from the fact that a more
elaborate presentation of this system is in progress.8 I only hope that the
sketch I give here has sufficient coherence to lay the basis for the discus-
sion of privacy which is the primary concern of this essay.
Love, friendship and trust are not just vague feelings or emotions;
they each comprise a system of dispositions, beliefs and attitudes which
are organized according to identifiable principles. Though love, friend-
ship and trust differ from each other, they each build on a common con-
ception of personality and its entitlements. This conception is a moral
conception of the basic entitlements and duties of persons in regard to
each other, and the structure of that conception is articulated by what I
call the principle of morality and the correlative attitude of respect.
The view of morality upon which my conception of privacy rests is
one which recognizes basic rights in persons, rights to which all are enti-
tled equally, by virtue of their status as persons. These rights are subject
to qualification only in order to ensure equal protection of the same
rights in others. In this sense, the view is Kantian; it requires recogni-
tion of persons as ends, and forbids the overriding of their most funda-
mental interests for the purpose of maximizing the happiness or welfare
of all. It has received contemporary exposition in the work of John
Rawls, who-summing up the fundamental interests of persons in the
term "liberty"-has formulated the maxim that social institutions must
be framed so as to entitle each person to the maximum liberty compati-
ble with a like liberty for all.4
3. For a preliminary statement of the larger scheme, see Fried, Reason and Action, 11
NATURAL L.F. 13 (1966).
4. The ethical system I sketch here is essentially Kantian. Different aspects of it are
expressed in I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (L. Beck trau1si.
1959) and in I. KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (J. Ladd transl. 1965). For a
discussion of the use of the term morality to apply primarily to the principles governing
the relations of persons with each other see Falk, Morality, Self and Others, and Frankena,
Recent Conceptions of Morality, in MORALITY AND TIE LANGUAGE OF CONDUCr (I. Casta.
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The principle of morality does not purport to represent the highest
value in a person's economy of values and interests. It necessarily as-
sumes that persons have a variety of substantive values and interests and
it is consistent with a large range of ethical systems which rank these
values and interests in many different ways. It functions rather as a con-
straint upon systems and orderings of values and interests, demanding
that whatever their content might be, they may be pursued only if and
to the extent that they are consistent with an equal right of all persons
to a similar liberty to pursue their interests, whatever they might be.
Thus the principle of morality, far from representing a complete system
of values, establishes only the equal liberty of each person to define and
pursue his values free from undesired impingements by others. The
principal of morality establishes not a complete value system but the ba-
sic entitlements of persons vis&-vis each other.5
Correlative to this view of morality-and indeed to any view which
recognizes moral entitlements in persons-is the concept of respect.0 Re-
spect is the attitude which is manifested when a person observes the con-
straints of the principle of morality in his dealings with another person,
and thus respects the basic rights of the other. Respect is also an attitude
which may be taken in part as defining the concept of a person: persons
are those who are obliged to observe the constraints of the principle of
morality in their dealings with each other,7 and thus to show respect to-
wards each other.8 Self-respect is, then, the attitude by which a person
believes himself to be entitled to be treated by other persons in accor-
dance with the principle of morality.
The principle of morality and its correlative, respect, lie at the bot-
tom of our conception of justice and fair play, as moral philosophers
fieda 8: G. Nakhnikian eds. 1963). Much of what I say derives, however, not from Kant.
but more directly from the writings of John Rawls, who in his published and unpublished
work has developed a comprehensive system of concepts and principles. In addition to the
published articles (Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND Pmw.son"
3 (S. Hook ed. 1964); The Sense of Justice, 72 Pmn.. REv. 281 (1963); Constitutional Liberty
and the Concept of Justice, in NoMos VI, JUsTICE 98 (C. Friedrich & J. Chapman eds. 1963);
Justice as Fairness, 67 PmL. REV. 164 (1958)), I have profited greatly from an opportunity
to read Professor Rawls' unpublished chapters on justice and his lectures on Kant and
Hegel. See also Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PmL. Rrv. 175 (1955).
5. For a discussion see Fried, Natural Law and the Concept of Justice, 74 EmTIcs 237,
250 (1964).
6. The concept of respect is also Kantian. I. KANT, CRmIQuE or PRAcrIcA. RrAsoN 76-
84 (L. Beck transl. 1956). The best recent discussion of this concept of respect and its
relation to personality is J. PAoE'r, TuE MORAL JUDGMENT oF THE Cm (1L Gabain transl.
1948). An excellent and fundamental illustration of the importance of respect in human
relations is Hegel's dialectic of the master and the slave, discussed in 2 J. PLasrxz.z
Mf.AN Amo Socwry 154-56, 188-92 (1963).
7. The condition is sufficient, not necessary, since children, lunatics, and &ome others
are also to be considered persons. All persons are entitled to the respect of other persons.
8. See generally PrAtEr, supra note 6; Rawls, The Sense of Justice, sura note 4.
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have convincingly argued. Perhaps less obviously, they play an impor-
tant part in our concepts of love, friendship and trust.9 It is my thesis
that an essential part of the morality which underlies these relations is
the constraint of respect for the privacy of all, by state and citizen alike.
IV.
There can be no thought of counting on an accepted core of meaning
in developing the concept of love. What I say about love therefore can-
not be taken as expressing a synthesis of all that has plausibly been
thought and said on the subject. Nevertheless an important tradition of
thought about love holds that it is a necessary feature of that emotion
that the beloved person be valued for his own sake, and not on account
of some attribute or product.'0 This aspect of love corresponds to the re-
spect which we are obligated to accord each other. But morality requires
impartial respect; love, surely, is not so impartial. The respect required
by morality is a necessary condition for love; it is not sufficient. The fur-
ther element in love is a spontaneous relinquishment of certain entitle.
ments of one's own to the beloved, a free and generous relinquishment
inspired by a regard which goes beyond impartial respect. But a sense of
freedom and generosity depends-logically depends-on a sense of the
secure possession of the claims one renounces and the gifts one bestows.
I shall argue that the nature of the gifts of love and friendship is such
that privacy is necessary to provide one important aspect of security.
This account has emphasized the necessity to love of a voluntary relin-
quishment of rights. But love is not, of course, so negative nor so one-
sided. Persons love, hoping to be loved in return, and thus the fulfilled
form of the relationship is one of mutual relinquishment of entitle-
ment, but not simply of relinquishment. The fulfilled form is the mu-
tual relinquishment of rights in favor of new, shared interests which the
lovers create and value as the expression of their relationship.
Thus love is an active and creative relationship not only of reciprocal
relinquishment but reciprocal support as well. The structure of this re-
ciprocal relationship is complex and elusive," and I shall not analyze it
further here. For present purposes it is sufficient to see that the gift, the
9. For a discussion of the relationship between these concepts and the principle of
morality see Rawls, The Sense of Justice, supra note 4. Although my account differs from
Rawls' in some respects, it is based on his.
10. Cf. Apusoru, NrcoMAcHnAN ETHIcs bk. 8, chs. 2-3.
11. For an excellent discussion see M. SCHELER, THE NATURE OF SYMPATitY, especially
ch. 7 (P. Heath transl. 1954).
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relinquishment, is logically prior to the relationship which requires it;
and if privacy is necessary to the first, it is necessary to the second.
Friendship differs from love largely in the degree of absorption in the
relationship and of the significance which the relationship has in the to-
tal economy of a person's life and interests. Allowing for these differ-
ences of degree, love and friendship are close in that they have a similar
relation to the more general concepts of morality and respect. And that
similar relation is all that I propose here concerning friendship.
Intuitively, trust is an attitude of expectation about another person.
But it would be a mistake to see it as simply a recognition of a disposi-
tion in another and a reliance that he will act in accordance with that
disposition. 1- To be sure, we have expressions such as "trust him to do
that," where "that" may be a vile deed which we know to be in character
for that person, or perhaps a fit of sneezing during a grand evening at
the opera on the part of a person given to sneezing when in close prox-
imity to perfumed ladies. But these usages are ironical. Although trust
has to do with reliance on a disposition of another person, it is reliance
on a disposition of a special sort: the disposition to act morally, to deal
fairly with others, to live up to one's undertakings, and so on. Thus to
trust another is first of all to expect him to accept the principle of moral-
ity in his dealings with you, to respect your status as a person, your per-
sonality.
Trust, like love and friendship, is in its central sense a relation: it is
reciprocal. Fairness does not require that we sacrifice our interests for
the sake of those who are not willing to show us a similar forbearance.
Thus as to those who do not accept morality, who are wicked and deceit-
ful, the occasion for trust does not arise. We do not trust them, and they
have no reason to trust us in the full sense of a relationship of mutual
expectation, for our posture towards them is not one of cooperative mu-
tual forbearance but of defensive watchfulness. Thus not only can a
thoroughly untrustworthy person not be trusted; he cannot trust others,
for he is disabled from entering into the relations of voluntary recipro-
cal forbearance for mutual advantage which trust consists of. At most an
untrustworthy person can predict more or less accurately how another
will behave, but the behavior he predicts will not arise out of a relation
of mutual respect which each party has for the personality of the other
12. For a brilliant sociological analysis of trust, which seems perhaps to overemphasize
this aspect of trust, see Garfinkel, A Conception of, and Experiments with, "Trust" as a
Condition of Stable Concerted Actions, in MOTIVATION AND SOCIAL I['Tfl.mAcnoN 187 (0.
Harvey ed. 1963).
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and a reciprocal willingness to work together according to the con-
straints of morality.
Trust is like love and friendship in that it is a "free" relationship. Mo-
rality does not require that we enter into relations of trust with our fel-
low men. But trust differs from love or friendship in that it is not always
a relation we seek simply for its own sake. It is more functional. Persons
build relations on trust in part because such relations are useful to ac-
complish other ends. (In a sense love and friendship are needed for the
pursuit of ends too, but they are ends that arise out of the relationship
itself, and are shared in it.) However, the other ends never dominate en-
tirely: they may be attainable without genuine trust, and the recourse
to trust is then an independent and concurrent affirmation of respect for
human personality. So, whether as individuals or as states, we conduct
our business when we can on the basis of trust, not just because it is
more efficient to do so--it may not be-but because we value the rela-
dons built on trust for their own sake. Finally, trust is also less intrusive
than love or friendship. Trust can be limited to the particular matter
at hand, and does not imply a disposition to seek more and more mutu-
ally shared ends. Thus, one can trust persons for whom one has neither
love nor liking, although friendship and love imply, at least in the stan-
dard cases, trust as well.
V.
Privacy is closely implicated in the notions of respect and self-respect,
and of love, friendship and trust. Quite apart from any philosophical an-
alysis this is intuitively obvious. In this section I shall try to make the
connection explicit. In general it is my thesis that in developed social
contexts love, friendship and trust are only possible if persons enjoy and
accord to each other a certain measure of privacy.
It is necessary at the outset to sharpen the intuitive concept of pri-
vacy. As a first approximation, privacy seems to be related to secrecy, to
limiting the knowledge of others about oneself. This notion must be re-
fined. It is not true, for instance, that the less that is known about us the
more privacy we have. Privacy is not simply an absence of information
about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over in-
formation about ourselves.
To refer for instance to the privacy of a lonely man on a desert island
would be to engage in irony. The person who enjoys privacy is able to
grant or deny access to others. Even when one considers private situa-
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tions into which outsiders could not possibly intrude, the context im-
plies some alternative situation where the intrusion is possible. A man's
house may be private, for instance, but that is because it is constructed
-with doors, windows, window shades--to allow it to be made private,
and because the law entitles a man to exclude unauthorized persons.
And even the remote vacation hide-away is private just because one re-
sorts to it in order-in part-to preclude access to unauthorized persons.
Privacy, thus, is control over knowledge about oneself. But it is not
simply control over the quantity of information abroad; there are
modulations in the quality of the knowledge as well. We may not mind
that a person knows a general fact about us, and yet feel our privacy in-
vaded if he knows the details. For instance, a casual acquaintance may
comfortably know that I am sick, but it would violate my privacy if he
knew the nature of the illness. Or a good friend may know what particu-
lar illness I am suffering from, but it would violate my privacy if he
were actually to witness my suffering from some symptom which he
must know is associated with the disease.13
VI.
There are reasons other than its relation to love, friendship and trust
why we value privacy. Most obviously, privacy in its dimension of con-
trol over information is an aspect of personal liberty. Acts derive their
meaning partly from their social context-from how many people know
about them and what the knowledge consists of.14 A reproof adminis-
tered out of the hearing of third persons may be an act of kindness, but
if administered in public it becomes cruel and degrading. Thus, for in-
stance, if a man cannot be sure that third persons are not listening-if
his privacy is not secure-he is denied the freedom to do what he
regards as an act of kindness.
Besides giving us control over the context in which we act, privacy
has a more defensive role in protecting our liberty. We may wish to do
or say things not forbidden by the restraints of morality, but which are
nevertheless unpopular or unconventional. If we thought that our every
word and deed were public, fear of disapproval or more tangible retalia-
13. These modulations are explored with great subtlety and a wealth of concrete illus-
trations in E. GorFA hN, BEHAVIOR m PuBLc PLAcES (1963); E. Gorrss.N, -icomi-rans
(1961); E. GoFFMrAN, THE PRESFNTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
14. The writings of Erving Goffmnan, supra note 13, are replete with illustrations of
the connections between context and relations among persons.
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tion might keep us from doing or saying things which we would do or
say if we could be sure of keeping them to ourselves or within a circle of
those who we know approve or tolerate our tastes.la
For these important reasons, among others, men would value privacy
even if there were nothing in the world called love, friendship or trust.
These reasons support the familiar arguments for the right of privacy.
Yet they leave privacy with less security than we feel it deserves; they
leave it vulnerable to arguments that a particular invasion of privacy
will secure to us other kinds of liberty which more than compensate for
what is lost. To present privacy then, only as an aspect of or an aid to
general liberty, is to miss some of its most significant differentiating fea-
tures. The value of title to control of some information about ourselves
is more nearly absolute than that. For privacy is the necessary context
for relationships which we would hardly be human if we had to do with-
out-the relationships of love, friendship and trust.
Love and friendship, as analyzed here, involve the initial respect for
the rights of others which morality requires of everyone. They further
involve the voluntary and spontaneous relinquishment of something be-
tween friend and friend, lover and lover. The title to information about
oneself conferred by privacy provides the necessary something. To be
friends or lovers persons must be intimate to some degree with each
other. But intimacy is the sharing of information about one's actions,
beliefs, or emotions which one does not share with all, and which one
has the right not to share with anyone. By conferring this right, privacy
creates the moral capital which we spend in friendship and love.
The entitlements of privacy are not just one kind of entitlement
among many which a lover can surrender to show his love. Love or
friendship can be partially expressed by the gift of other rights-gifts of
property or of service. But these gifts, without the intimacy of shared
private information, cannot alone constitute love or friendship. The
man who is generous with his possessions, but not with himself, can
hardly be a friend, nor-and this more clearly shows the necessity of pri-
vacy for love---can the man who, voluntarily or involuntarily, shares
everything about himself with the world indiscriminately.
Privacy is essential to friendship and love in another respect besides
providing what I call "moral capital." The rights of privacy are among
those basic entitlements which men must respect in each other; and mu-
tual respect is the minimal precondition for love and friendship.
15. Cf. Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L. REV.
157, 157-58, 161-65 (1954).
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Privacy also provides the means for modulating those degrees of
friendship which fall short of love. Few persons have the emotional re-
sources to be on the most intimate terms with all their friends. Privacy
grants the control over information which enables us to maintain de-
grees of intimacy. Thus even between friends the restraints of privacy
apply; since friendship implies a voluntary relinquishment of private
information, one will not wish to know what his friend or lover has not
chosen to share with him. The rupture of this balance by a third party-
the state perhaps-thrusting information concerning one friend upon
another might well destroy the limited degree of intimacy the two have
achieved.
Finally, there is a more extreme case where privacy serves not to save
something which will be "spent" on a friend, but to keep it from all the
world. There are thoughts whose expression to a friend or lover would
be a hostile act, though the entertaining of them is completely consis-
tent with friendship or love. That is because these thoughts, prior to be-
ing given expression, are mere unratified possibilities for action. Only
by expressing them do we adopt them, choose them as part of ourselves,
and draw them into our relations with others.18 Now a sophisticated per-
son knows that a friend or lover must entertain thoughts which if ex-
pressed would be wounding, and so-it might be objected-why should
he attach any significance to their actual expression? In a sense the ob-
jection is well taken. If it were possible to give expression to these
thoughts and yet make clear to ourselves and to others that we do not
thereby ratify, adopt them as our own, it might be that in some relations
at least another could be allowed complete access to us. But this possibil-
ity is not a very likely one.17 Thus this most complete form of privacy is
perhaps also the most basic, as it is necessary not only to our freedom to
define our relations to others but also to our freedom to define our-
selves.' To be deprived of this control not only over what we do but
over who we are is the ultimate assault on liberty, personality, and self-
respect.
Trust is the attitude of expectation that another will behave accord-
ing to the constraints of morality. Insofar as trust is only instrumental to
16. Compare . MONTAIGNE, De la Solitude, in Ess.As, ch. 38, with J.-P. SriTU. B.Lc
AND NOTHINGNESS pt. 2 (H. Barnes transl. 1956).
17. Perhaps it is, after all, one of the functions of psychoanalysis to provide such a
possibility.
18. Erving Goffman has suggested to me in conversation that new methods of data
storage and retrieval pose a threat to privacy in that it is possible to make readily acces.
sible information about a person's remote and forgotten past. This means a person is
unable to change his own and other's definitions of him as readily as once ma) hase btwen
the case.
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the more convenient conduct of life, its purposes could be as well served
by cheap and efficient surveillance of the person upon whom one de-
pends. One does not trust machines or animals; one takes the fullest
economically feasible precautions against their going wrong. Often,
however, we choose to trust people where it would be safer to take
precautions-to watch them or require a bond from them. This must
be because, as I have already argued, we value the relation of trust for
its own sake. It is one of those relations, less inspiring than love or
friendship, but also less tiring, through which we express our humanity.
There can be no trust where there is no possibility of error. More spe-
cifically, a man cannot know that he is trusted unless he has a right to
act without constant surveillance so that he knows he can betray the
trust. Privacy confers that essential right. And since, as I have argued,
trust in its fullest sense is reciprocal, the man who cannot be trusted can-
not himself trust or learn to trust. Without privacy and the possibility of
error which it protects that aspect of his humanity is denied to him.
VII.
The previous sections have explored the meaning of the concept of
privacy and the significance of privacy to the notion of personality and
to the relations of love, trust and friendship which are inseparable from
it. The conclusions have been abstract and entirely general. But the con-
crete expressions of privacy in particular societies and cultures differ
enormously. It remains to be shown why such differences both are to be
expected and are entirely consistent with the general conceptions I have
put forward.
In concrete situations and actual societies, control over information
about oneself, like control over one's bodily security or property, can
only be relative and qualified. As is true for property or bodily security,
the control over privacy must be limited by the rights of others. And as
in the cases of property and bodily security, so too with privacy the
more one ventures into the outside, the more one pursues one's other
interests with the aid of, in competition with, or even in the presence of
others, the more one must risk invasions of privacy. Moreover, as with
property and personal security, it is the business of legal and social insti-
tutions to define and protect the right of privacy which emerges intact
from the hurly-burly of social interactions. Now it would be absurd to
argue that these concrete definitions and protections, differing as they
do from society to society, are or should be strict derivations from gen-
eral principles, the only legitimate variables being differing empirical
486
Vol. 77: 475, 1968
Privacy
circumstances (such as, for instance, differing technologies or climatic
conditions). The delineation of standards must be left to a political and
social process the results of which will accord with justice if two condi-
tions are met: (1) the process itself is just, that is the interests of all are
fairly represented; and (2) the outcome of the process protects basic dig-
nity and provides moral capital for personal relations in the form of
absolute title to at least some information about oneself.1 0
The particular areas of life which are protected by privacy will be
conventional at least in part, not only because they are the products of
political processes, but also because of one of the reasons we value pri-
vacy. Insofar as privacy is regarded as moral capital for relations of love,
friendship and trust, there are situations where what kinds of informa-
tion one is entitled to keep to oneself is not of the first importance. The
important thing is that there be some information which is protected.'-
Convention may quite properly rule in determining the particular areas
which are private.
Convention plays another more important role in fostering privacy
and the respect and esteem which it protects; it designates certain areas,
intrinsically no more private than other areas, as symbolic of the whole
institution of privacy, and thus deserving of protection beyond their
particular importance. This apparently exaggerated respect for conven-
tionally protected areas compensates for the inevitable fact that privacy
is gravely compromised in any concrete social system: it is compromised
by the inevitably and utterly just exercise of rights by others, it is com-
promised by the questionable but politically sanctioned exercise of
rights by others, it is compromised by conduct which society does not
condone but which it is unable or unwilling to forbid, and it is compro-
mised by plainly wrongful invasions and aggressions. In all this hurly-
burly there is a real danger that privacy might be crushed altogether, or
what would be as bad, that any venture outside the most limited area of
activity would mean risking an almost total compromise of privacy.
Given these threats to privacy in general, social systems have given
symbolic importance to certain conventionally designated areas of pri-
vacy. Thus in our culture the excretory functions are shielded by more
or less absolute privacy, so much so that situations in which this privacy
is violated are experienced as extremely distressing, as detracting from
one's dignity and self-esteem. 21 But there does not seem to be any reason
19. Cf. Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, supra note 4.
20. Thus, for instance, so long as the mails are still private, wire tapping may not be
so severe an imposition, particularly if people do not in any case consider telephone con-
versations as necessarily private.
21. There is another form of mortification in total institutions; beginning with ad-
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connected with the principles of respect, esteem and the like why this
would have to be so, and one can imagine other cultures in which it was
not so, but where the same symbolic privacy was attached to, say, eating
and drinking.22 There are other more subtly modulated symbolic areas
of privacy, some of which merge into what I call substantive privacy
(that is, areas where privacy does protect substantial interests). The very
complex norms of privacy about matters of sex and health are good ex-
amples.
An excellent, very different sort of example of a contingent, symbolic
recognition of an area of privacy as an expression of respect for personal
integrity is the privilege against self-incrimination and the associated
doctrines denying officials the power to compel other kinds of informa-
tion without some explicit warrant. By according the privilege as fully
as it does, our society affirms the extreme value of the individual's con-
trol over information about himself. To be sure, prying into a man's
personal affairs by asking questions of others or by observing him is not
prevented by the privilege. Rather it is the point of the privilege that a
man cannot be forced to make public information about himself.
Thereby his sense of control over what others know of him is signifi-
cantly enhanced, even if other sources of the same information exist.
Without his cooperation, the other sources are necessarily incomplete,
since he himself is the only ineluctable witness to his own present life,
public or private, internal or manifest. And information about himself
which others have to give out is in one sense information over which he
has already relinquished control.
mission a kind of contaminative exposure occurs. On the outside, the individual can
hold objects of self-feeling--such as his body, his immediate actions, his thoughts, and
some of his possessions-dear of contact with alien and contaminating things. But In
total institutions these territories of the self are violated; the boundary that the Indi-
vidual places between his being and the environment is invaded and the embodiments
of self profaned.
New audiences not only learn discreditable facts about oneself that are ordinarily
concealed but are also in a position to perceive some of these facts directly. Prisoners
and mental patients cannot prevent their visitors from seeing them in humiliating
circumstances. Another example is the shoulder patch of ethnic identification worn by
concentration-camp inmates. Medical and security examinations often expose the In-
mate physically, sometimes to persons of both sexes; a similar exposure follows from
collective sleeping arrangements and doorless toilets. An extreme here, perhaps, Is the
situation of a self-destructive mental patient who is stripped naked for what is felt
to be his own protection and. placed in a constantly lit seclusion room, into whose
Judas window any person passing on the ward can peer. In general, of course, the in-
mate is never fully alone; he is always within sight and often earshot of someone, If
only his fellow inmates. Prison cages with bars for walls fully realize such exposure.
E. GOFFIAN, AsYLuMs 23-25 (1961) (footnotes omitted).
22. See generally A. WEsrIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM ch. 1 (1967). It is apparently tradi.
tional for the commanding officer of a naval vessel to eat alone.
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The privilege is contingent and symbolic. It is part of a whole struc-
ture of rules by which there is created an institution of privacy sufficient
to the sense of respect, trust and intimacy. It is contingent in that it can-
not, I believe, be shown that some particular set of rules is necessary to
the existence of such an institution of privacy. It is symbolic because the
exercise of the privilege provides a striking expression of society's will-
ingness to accept constraints on the pursuit of valid, perhaps vital inter-
ests in order to recognize the right of privacy and the respect for the
individual that privacy entails. Conversely, a proceeding in which com-
pulsion is brought to bear on an individual to force him to make revela-
tions about himself provides a striking and dramatic instance of a denial
of title to control information about oneself, to control the picture we
would have others have of us.2 In this sense such a procedure quite
rightly seems profoundly humiliating2 4 Nevertheless it is not clear to
me that a system is unjust which sometimes allows such an imposition.
In calling attention to the symbolic aspect of some areas of privacy I
do not mean to minimize their importance. On the contrary, they are
highly significant as expressions of respect for others in a general situa-
tion where much of what we do to each other may signify a lack of re-
spect or at least presents no occasion for expressing respect. That this is
so is shown not so much in the occasions where these symbolic con-
straints are observed, for they are part of our system of expectations, but
where they are violated.2 Not only does a person feel his standing is
gravely compromised by such symbolic violations, but also those who
wish to degrade and humiliate others often choose just such symbolic ag-
gressions and invasions on the assumed though conventional area of pri-
vacy.
VIII.
Let us return now to the concrete problem of electronic monitoring
to see whether the foregoing elucidation of the concept of privacy will
23. The struggle between Thomas More and King Henry VI's officers to compel More
to state his views on Henry's claims to ecclesiastical supremacy provides an example of
how this aspect of privacy is linked to conceptions of personal integrity. See R. ClUAwni, s,
THo1As MoE (1935).
24. It is just because the privilege bears this relation to the notion of personal integrity.
at once intimate and symbolic, that criticisms which examine it as a tool for accomplishing
this or that other purpose-e.g., 6-7 J. BENTA,.-, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in Til
WoRus OF Jmumry BENTHA&M (J. Bowring ed. 1843); McNaughton, supra note 2---eem w
unanswerable yet one feels they somehow miss the point.
25. Erving Goffman gives numerous examples of subtle, implicit norms, of whroe per-
vasive and powerful hold on us we are quite unaware until they arc violated. E. GoFrFAN,
BFuvAWoa i PuBLIc PLAcas (1963).
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help to establish on firmer ground the intuitive objection that monitor-
ing is an intolerable violation of privacy. Let us consider the more intru-
sive forms of monitoring where not only location but conversations and
perhaps other data are monitored.
Obviously such a system of monitoring drastically curtails or elimi-
nates altogether the power to control information about oneself. But, it
might be said, this is not a significant objection if we assume the moni-
tored data will go only to authorized persons-probation or parole offi-
cers-and cannot be prejudicial so long as the subject of the monitoring
is not violating the conditions under which he is allowed to be at liberty.
But this retort misses the importance of privacy as a context for all
kinds of relations, from the most intense to the most casual. For all of
these may require a context of some degree of intimacy, and intimacy is
made impossible by monitoring.
It is worth being more precise about this notion of intimacy. Moni-
toring obviously presents vast opportunities for malice and misunder-
standing on the part of authorized personnel. For that reason the subject
has reason to be constantly apprehensive and inhibited in what he does.
There is always an unseen audience, which is the more threatening be-
cause of the possibility that one may forget about it and let down his
guard, as one would not with a visible audience. But even assuming the
benevolence and understanding of the official audience, there are seri-
ous consequences to the fact that no degree of true intimacy is possible
for the subject. Privacy is not, as we have seen, just a defensive right. It
rather forms the necessary context for the intimate relations of love and
friendship which give our lives much of whatever affirmative value they
have. In the role of citizen or fellow worker, one need reveal himself to
no greater extent than is necessary to display the attributes of compe-
tence and morality appropriate to those relations. In order to be a friend
or lover one must reveal far more of himself. Yet where any intimate
revelation may be heard by monitoring officials, it loses the quality of ex-
clusive intimacy required of a gesture of love or friendship. Thus moni-
toring, in depriving one of privacy, destroys the possibility of bestowing
the gift of intimacy, and makes impossible the essential dimension of
love and friendship.
Monitoring similarly undermines the subject's capacity to enter into
relations of trust. As I analyzed trust, it required the possibility of error
on the part of the person trusted. The negation of trust is constant sur-
veillance-such as monitoring-which minimizes the possibility of un-
detected default. The monitored parolee is denied the sense of self-re-
spect inherent in being trusted by the government which has released
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him. More important, monitoring prevents the parolee from entering
into true relations of trust with persons in the outside world. An em-
ployer, unaware of the monitoring, who entrusts a sum of money to the
parolee cannot thereby grant him the sense of responsibility and auton-
omy which an unmonitored person in the same position would have.
The parolee in a real-if special and ironical-sense, cannot be trusted.
Now let us consider the argument that however intrusive monitoring
may seem, surely prison life is more so. In part, of course, this will be a
matter of fact. It may be that even a reasonably secure and well-run
prison will allow prisoners occasions for conversation among them-
selves, with guards, or with visitors, which are quite private. Such a
prison regime would in this respect be less intrusive than monitoring.
Often prison regimes do not allow even this, and go far toward depriv-
ing a prisoner of any sense of privacy: if the cells have doors, these may
be equipped with peep-holes. But there is still an important difference
between this kind of prison and monitoring: the prison environment is
overtly, even punitively unprivate. The contexts for relations to others
are obviously and drastically different from what they are on the "out-
side." This, it seems to me, itself protects the prisoner's human orienta-
tion where monitoring only assails it. If the prisoner has a reasonably
developed capacity for love, trust and friendship and has in fact experi-
enced ties of this sort, he is likely to be strongly aware (at least for a
time) that prison life is a drastically different context from the one in
which he enjoyed those relations, and this awareness will militate
against his confusing the kinds of relations that can obtain in a "total in-
stitution" like a prison with those of freer social settings on the outside.
Monitoring, by contrast, alters only in a subtle and unobtrusive way
-though a significant one-the context for relations. The subject ap-
pears free to perform the same actions as others and to enter the same re-
lations, but in fact an important element of autonomy, of control over
one's environment is missing: he cannot be private. A prisoner can
adopt a stance of withdrawal, of hibernation as it were, and thus pre-
serve his sense of privacy intact to a degree. A person subject to monitor-
ing by virtue of being in a free environment, dealing with people who
expect him to have certain responses, capacities and dispositions, is
forced to make at least a show of intimacy to the persons he works
closely with, those who would be his friends, and so on. They expect
these things of him, because he is assumed to have the capacity and dis-
position to enter into ordinary relations with them. Yet if he does-if,
for instance, he enters into light banter with slight sexual overtones with
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the waitress at the diner where he eats regularly20-he has been forced
to violate his own integrity by being forced to reveal to his official moni-
tors even so small an aspect of his private personality, the personality he
wishes to reserve for persons towards whom he will make some gestures
of intimacy and friendship. Theoretically, of course, a monitored pa-
rolee might adopt the same attitude of withdrawal that a prisoner does,
but in fact that too would be a costly and degrading experience. He
would be tempted, as in prison he would not be, to "give himself away"
and to act like everyone else, since in every outward respect he seems
like everyone else. Moreover, by withdrawing, the person subject to
monitoring would risk seeming cold, unnatural, odd, inhuman to the
very people whose esteem and affection he craves. In prison the circum-
stances dictating a reserved and tentative facade are so apparent to all
that adopting such a facade is no reflection on the prisoner's humanity.
Finally, the insidiousness of a technique which forces a man to betray
himself in this humiliating way or else seem inhuman is compounded
when one considers that the subject is also forced to betray others who
may become intimate with him. Even persons in the overt oppressive-
ness of a prison do not labor under the burden of this double betrayal.
As against all of these considerations, there remains the argument that
so long as monitoring depends on the consent of the subject, who feels it
is preferable to prison, to close off this alternative in the name of a moo.
rality so intimately concerned with liberty is absurd. This argument
may be decisive; I am not at all confident that the alternative of moni-
tored release should be closed off. My analysis does show, I think that it
involves costs to the prisoner which are easily overlooked, that on inspec-
tion it is a less desirable alternative than might at first appear. More-
over, monitoring presents systematic dangers to potential subjects as a
class. Its availability as a compromise between conditional release and
continued imprisonment may lead officials who are in any doubt
whether or not to trust a man on parole or probation to assuage their
doubts by resorting to monitoring.
The seductions of monitored release disguise not only a cost to the
subject but to society as well. The discussion of trust should make clear
that unmonitored release is a very different experience from monitored
release, and so the educational and rehabilitative effect of unmonitored
release is also different. Unmonitored release affirms in a far more signi-
ficant way the relations of trust between the convicted criminal and soci-
ety which the criminal violated by his crime and which we should now
26. Cf. E. GOFFMAN, ENCOUNTERS 37-45 (1961).
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be seeking to reestablish. But trust can only arise, as any parent knows,
through the experience of being trusted.
Ix.
The discussion of privacy in this essay has explored the meaning and
significance of the concept. It reveals privacy as that aspect of social or-
der by which persons control access to information about themselves.
How this control is granted to individuals and the means for bringing
about the social structures which express the notion of privacy have not
been of direct concern. Clearly many of the social structures by which
persons express their respect for the privacy of others are informal and
implicit. The sanctions for violating the expectations set up by these
structures, if they exist at all, are often subtle and informal too. But le-
gal rules also play a large part in establishing the social context of pri-
vacy. These rules guarantee to a person the claim to control certain
areas, his home, perhaps his telephone communications, etc., and back
this guarantee with enforceable sanctions. Now these legal norms are
more or less incomprehensible without some understanding of what
kind of a situation is sought to be established with their aid. Without
this understanding we cannot sense the changing law they demand in
changing circumstances.
What is less obvious is that law is not just an instrument for protect-
ing privacy; it is an essential element, in our culture, of the institution
itself. The concept of privacy requires, as we have seen, a sense of con-
trol and a justified, acknowledged power to control aspects of one's envi-
ronment. But in most developed societies the only way to give a person
the full measure of both the sense and the fact of control is to give him a
legal title to control. A legal right to control is control which is the
least open to question and argument; it is the kind of control we are
most serious about. As we have seen, privacy is not just an absence of
information abroad about ourselves; it is a feeling of security in control
over that information. By using the public, impersonal and ultimate
institution of law to grant persons this control, we at once put the right
to control as far beyond question as we can and at the same time show
how seriously we take that right.
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